Introduction The Place of Regulation and Antitrust in Telecommunications Law
The persistent problem of monopoly has brought two different sorts of state responses that coexist only uneasily with each other. The first of these exemplified by the Sherman Act seeks to prevent monopolization by private firms. The second deals with direct regulation of what is often called natural monopolies, that is industries characterized by marginal costs below average cost, so that a single producer is the cheapest supplier of the relevant service. 1 Occasionally, efforts are made to get the best of both worlds. Just that happened February, 1996, the United States Congress passed with great fanfare the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which was designed to "promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies." 2 The Supreme Court has placed its benediction on the transformative power of the Act, 3 The mixed success under the MFJ, coupled with the rise of both cellular technology and the Internet, led to the 1996 Telecommunications Act. In addition, to the interconnection obligation set out above, the LECs (now rechristened incumbent LECs or ILECs) were subject to two additional dutiesto provide unbundled access to key network elements, and to sell at wholesale prices those telecommunications services that it provides to its own customers at retail. 9 To broker these agreements, the FCC and the state regulatory commissions were given regulatory authority under sections 251 and 252 of the 1996 Act. 10 Yet regulation cannot be avoided here either, for t these interconnection rates can only be established with reference to some appropriate rate base, either on historical or forward looking costs. The Supreme Court has upheld that rules as falling within the scope of the FCC's mandate, but took a diplomatic pass on the question of whether the forward-looking total long-run incremental cost rules are confiscatory under the takings clause. 11 This overpromotion of the ends has powerful legal consequences. At its inception, it was commonly thought that battles under the 1996 would take place exclusively or largely in the administrative arena. In this regard, the extravagant claims that the Act has introduced a competitive system has injected a new player into the system: a spate of private actions against the LECs on an amalgam of theories that rest of the combined impact of the Sherman Act and the 1996 Act.
The three most notable suits in this genre all represent important variations on the basic theme. The first of these three suits, Goldwasser v. Ameritech, 12 was a class action brought against Ameritech by its own customers. The gist of the action was that Ameritech used its monopoly power to delay the introduction of rival CLECs, which thus reduced the opportunities for Ameritech's customers to realize the competitive gains promised under the 1996 Act. The suit rested both on the Sherman Act and the 1996 Act, most specifically the statutory duties contained in section 251(b), dealing with interconnections. The second of these suits was the Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko v. Verizon Communications, 13 a class action brought by customers of AT&T, which as a CLEC had worked out section 251 interconnection agreements with Verizon. Once the agreement was in place, and AT&T had been signing up former Verizon customers, AT&T alleged specific statutory violations which resulted in a consent decree under which Verizon paid $10,000,000 to AT&T and $3,000,000 to the United States. The complaint urged that Verizon's dilatory tactics with AT&T resulted in economic loss to the class of AT&T customers. The third is Covad Communications Co. v.
BellSouth. 14 There are two different lines of attack that might be advanced in order to resist this complaint. The first of these applies to all of these cases indifferently and reaches the conclusion, as was done in Goldwasser, that the detailed statutory scheme under the 1996 Act imposed an extensive set of obligations to interconnect that went above and beyond anything found under the essential facilities doctrine in the antitrust law, under which the most that could be asked of a current provider is that it not block the entry of a future rival. It is important to understand that the case did not argue that there was some kind of implicit antitrust immunity under the Telecommunications Act, which would have been odd in light of the explicit savings clause. But it did argue that it was not possible to transmute ipso facto any alleged breach of statutory duty into an antitrust violation. This decision has as much application to direct parties as indirect parties, and thus operates independently of any standing and privity rules. I
shall not deal with it further in this paper, even though I will discuss at some length Judge Wood's treatment of the standing issue in that case.
As should be clear from the above remarks, the second way to attack the claims raised in Goldwasser 15 and Trinko. 16 but not Covad involves the question of whether the individual plaintiffs have standing to maintain their antitrust claims, which in at least some cases turns on the further question of whether they are in privity with the defendants. In this short paper I wish examine these procedural issues in as they apply to the telecommunications, with special reference to
Goldwasser and Trinko. In order to see how these arguments play out in this particular context, it is necessary to give some brief overview of how both of these concepts do and should work it in general.
The General Law of Standing and Privity
Standing. The idea of standing, it is now generally recognized, has both a constitutional and a pragmatic component. 17 At the constitutional level it is said that individual plaintiffs are entitled to bring actions in federal court only if they can show that they have "standing" to proceed. That standing requirement is not explicit in the United States Constitution, for the language of Article III, section 2 only states that the "judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity" that fall into the three familiar heads of diversity jurisdiction, federal question jurisdiction, and suits involving the United States as a party. The ostensible standing limitation is said to derive from the use of the word "case," a term that sensibly excludes advisory opinions which involves a suit with only one party, but which does not in my view cover any litigation where the plaintiff wishes to gain some legal advantage-money, injunctions, declarations, etc.-that the defendant wishes to restrict. The current law seems to require that the plaintiff therefore show some form of a pocketbook interest above and beyond that which is shared by the general population. In many cases, of course, that claim is routinely satisfied, but in an important class of cases where the plaintiff protests against some structural injustice-the appointment of a federal bishop in Washington D.C., the concealment of the activities of the CIA-a wrong which may be suffered by all is said to be one for which no individual is entitled to a remedy. In my view, these cases represent a partial repeal of the general principle of judicial review that has been a staple of our law since Marbury v.
Madison 18 insofar as it makes it impossible for the Courts to rectify government abuses of power. in the sense that there is no deliberate and willful actions of third parties, and no natural events that sever causal connection. The harms are eminently "foreseeable" in the sense that these causal chains are so commonplace that only the social blind could ignore them. In many cases the putative defendant is also the "last wrongdoer" under a now discredited theory of proximate causation that allows the plaintiff to sue one and only one party-the last wrongdoer-in tort. 19 Even though the Supreme Court couches its standing discussion in proximate cause language 20 , it nonetheless takes some noncausal explanation as to why the indirect victims of these harms are not allowed to maintain actions for their admitted losses.
The persuasive reasons behind these social judgments are not tied to the vagaries of federal jurisdiction but to the social objectives of any system of tort (or as will become clear, statutory) liability. The usual point of tort is not solely to supply compensation to injured parties, although that is surely an essential part of the mix. It is also to secure deterrence against future repetitions of the wrongful actions, and to accomplish both of these objectives at some administratively acceptable cost. At this point we must take note of the common features when these various harms are arrayed side by side. The greatest harm comes to the person who is injured or killed. The derivative harms strike a broader class and are smaller in extent and more easily mitigated. In some cases, as with the injuries to spouses, that conclusion could easily be contested, which is why the American system generally allows both husbands and wives actions for the loss of consortium. 21 But the English system, where these actions were pioneered at common law, now takes bars suits by both husbands and wives. 22 Only a small minority of states children to bring suits for loss of consortium, and none to my knowledge extend the action to cover distant relatives, friends and the like. 23 The clear judgment in these cases is one based not on theories of causation, but on the economic law of diminishing returns to further action. The one prime suit against the tortfeasor is relatively easy to administer and it promises substantial damage awards. The plethora of actions that might be brought by family and associates are more numerous in number, are for smaller amounts of damages, and vary in their intensity given the ability of these distant parties to mitigate the losses in question. In a world of zero-transaction costs we might be prepared to allow all these individuals to sue for their losses in the name of optimal deterrence. But even that judgment is highly contestable. The underlying system is such that the dislocations that produce losses to some individuals also produce inadvertent gains to others. Think of the man who is lucky enough to marry the widow; or the junior employee who gets the opportunity to shine because his boss is no longer able to do the job. These can never be taken into account, so that full compensation for all losses results in systematic overdeterrence. To avoid these difficulties, the standing doctrine cuts off the second and more removed circle of harms which it is inefficient for any legal system to remedy. It thus produces a smaller class of tractable law suits that do better to minimize the sum of accident, deterrence, and administrative costs in running the tort system. 24 It also necessarily leaves a bad taste in the mouth because it means that individuals that do suffer real harms at the hands of the defendant do not get any form of direct relief. The price of administrative sanity is imperfect internalization of losses through the common law system-a trade that in general makes eminently good sense.
The need for the doctrine of standing has, paradoxically expanded, as the legal system seeks to remedy an ever greater class of harms. One illustration will have to suffice to make the basic point here. Environmental harms results from the spillage of pollution. These will damage the unowned fish that swim in the waters, and through them the fisherman who troll those waters, the processors who package the fish and the restaurants and supermarkets that wish to sell them to consumers in either their cooked or uncooked fashion. None of these harms count as causally remote, yet the doctrine of standing is routinely invoked to limit the new environmental tort to the fishermen, on the ground that the widely dispersed individuals in these other groups can mitigate their losses by looking, for example, to multiple sources of supply. 25 Privity. Closely associated with the doctrine of standing is the doctrine of privity. 26 Here the origin of the term comes from the notion of privity of contract, which means, roughly speaking, that the only persons who are allowed to obtain benefits or to sustain burdens under a contract are the parties to it. Like the standing doctrine of which it is a part, the privity doctrine is designed to cut The implicit economic logic behind Winterbottom is to view the sequential arrangements between the various parties as being governed by two contracts.
On this view if the driver has a grievance against his employer, he can maintain his suit for satisfaction. Thereafter the employer can seek indemnity from the repairman under his contract. In some cases, these two actions will each allow for the recovery of the full level of personal injuries. But sometimes this might not prove to be the optimal solution. The driver himself may have been to some extent at fault in his behavior; or the two parties could have agreed (as happened in nineteenth century England) to participate in some kind of a voluntary workers' compensation system that expanded the scope of coverage by eliminating the need to prove that the carriage was defective, while limiting the damages that could be recovered therefore. Likewise, on the upstream leg of the relationship, the original repairman could have insisted on a complete release in advance for damages caused by the coach, after allowing the employer to inspect the vehicle to his own satisfaction. In principle, these more precise adjustments of risk between the parties should outperform any legal injunction that mandates in all cases that the injured party receive full tort damages from the repairman regardless of what the network of contracts provided. In this regard, privity of contract is closely allied with the principle of freedom of contract.
The privity doctrine has not, as everyone knows, held the line in product liability cases. One disadvantage of the rule is that it always requires two actions when sometimes a single action could set matters in order. Another is that the middleman may prove insolvent, thereby insulating the original seller from suit. Yet even here it is vital to understand the constraint that operates in this action. Allowing the injured plaintiff in this case implies that the middle party drops out, so that one plaintiff is substituted in for another for the same injuries, without any increase in the overall burden of liability associated with the sale.
Yet this formulation then raises again the freedom of contract issue. If the defendant could have procured a limitation or release from liability from someone with whom he is in privity, then the same limitation or release should be allowed against the remote user. Indeed, once those limitations and releases are allowed, then the privity requirement becomes a strictly second order issue.
The original seller will not rely on the vagaries of the law to protect itself in dealings with remote parties. Rather, it will actively seek to place themselves in privity with the actual users of the product, so as to impose the needed contractual restrictions, including routinely those which prevent third-party beneficiary actions. 32 The contract between AT&T and Verizon also explicitly disclaimed any potential third-party beneficiary liability. 33 These moreover
should not be dismissed as abuses of the legal position: the downstream users 31 Cal. 1963) ., ushered in the modern product liability era precisely because they rejected all efforts by the manufacturer to get into privity with its ultimate users in order to limit the scope of liability by contract.
Just that position is ratified in Restatement 3rd, section 18, which says baldly: parties choose to waive this protection. In any event, the early cases of third party beneficiary liability all involve the collection of debts by third parties that were originally owing to the promisee. 36 The logic of these cases therefore follows the exact pattern of the early exceptions to the privity limitation. The creation of third party liability may shift the person to whom the promisor owes and obligation, but it does not increase the obligation so imposed. The great concern in all these cases is that the potential liability of the promisor (or product seller) must be funded out of the receipts of sale: that becomes a difficult task with an infinite expansion of the scope of liability, which is why consequential damages are routinely limited by contract. It is therefore no surprise that the common law refuses generally to recognize third party beneficiary actions to large classes of "incidental" beneficiaries, given the vast expansion of liability that it entails. 37 But again the problem boils down to questions of freedom of contract: in most standard complex agreements, explicit language is introduced to negate the possibility of any third party action in the event of contract breach.
The privity limitation is imposed by contract to bring potential liabilities in line with potential receipts.
The few judicial efforts to go beyond this result have generally met with stiff resistance and ultimate reversal. At point in time, there were some judicial stirrings that persons who suffered workplace accidents could bring a tort action against the insurer of the workers' compensation carrier for its negligent inspection of the premises. 38 But these actions were shut down by statute. 39 In another development, buyers of individual units sought to bring tort actions for 35 defective construction against the lenders to the project builder. 40 But again these actions tended to wither way in the face of a general rule that economic damages are not subject to the basic product liability rules. 41 
Standing and Privity in the Regulatory State
The principles of standing and privity carry over to the modern apparatus of the regulatory state, both generally and in connection with the antitrust laws.
At this point we switch from a vaguely contractual to a highly regulatory regime, so that the implicit movement toward freedom of contract noted above, does not carry over. But even within this regulatory framework one point does remain
true. The systems of direct regulation and private rights of action cannot get blood from a stone: the regulated parties are restricted in the revenues that they can collect. There must be parallel adjustments in the charges that can be imposed if the system is to be kept in equilibrium. That point takes on added urgency because all telecommunications companies are sitting ducks for antitrust actions since it is easy to allege that their (albeit diminished) statutory powers confers on them the kind of monopoly power that the Sherman Act is meant to counteract, notwithstanding the statutory duties of interconnection, unbundling and resale. In light of the context, the limitations on standing and privity should be reflected in the regulatory arena and, as a general matter they are. I shall first review the general modern law on standing and privity and then apply that analysis to the telecommunications context. committed on that broker-dealer. The decision incorporated by common law analogies a standing requirement into RICO actions, even though the basic statutory provision did not use the term, but in so many words covered "any person injured in his business or property." 43 The case made explicit reliance on the antitrust precedents under Section 15 of the Clayton Act, 44 which served as a model for RICO. In this case, as well as others, the standing requirement was unfortunately conflated with the rules of proximate causation, even though, as noted earlier, the standing requirement develops precisely because the rules of proximate causation are not restrictive enough with respect to indirect harms. 45 All this said, the "policy justifications" behind the Supreme Court's standing rules are not dependent on any proximate causation arguments, and these track perfectly the generalized arguments for the prudential standing requirement set out above. The first of these factors note that as other events intervene it becomes ever more difficult to determine the extent of loss that is attributable to the actions of the defendant. Knocking out remote parties from liability has, of course, the same effect that the privity limitation does in products liability cases. It places the risk of loss on the parties who are in possession of the relevant goods or in control of the relevant situation. The second concern noted in Holmes related to the need to avoid complex rules for apportioning losses among the multiple parties who form links in the causal chain. The last of
Holmes's relevant considerations is that suits brought by remote victims were 43 On its face that provision does not distinguish between direct and indirect victims of the defendant's wrong, for both types of parties are indeed "injured" if the only question at hand are the tests of proximate cause discussed above.
Nonetheless in Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court drew the distinction between direct and indirect purchasers that is found nowhere on the face of the statute, in parallel with the background principles of standing that have developed in tort and contract actions at common law. The upshot was that in a horizontal price fixing case, only the direct purchaser from the wrongful defendant has standing under the antitrust laws, to the exclusion of its own customers who have suffered from indirect harm.
In many of these cases, of course, the immediate buyer will be able to pass some or all of its overcharges on to its purchasers, some of whom may well be able to pass these overcharges further down the line. In an ideal administrative world, each of these persons should be able to sue for the full extent of its loss. resale to its buyers. 47 The second invokes the privity limitation to bar the remote purchaser from maintaining any action at all against the Sherman Act wrongdoer, even though he may have a remedy under contract against his immediate seller. These dual adjustments cancel each other out insofar as the price-fixer bears the full extent of the overcharge either way. The combined effect of these rules preserves the deterrent effect while simplifying the administrative costs of running the legal process. It follows therefore the common law rules of standing to a "T" and makes adjustments in the measure of recovery in order to get closer to optimal deterrence.
The Telecommunications Trinity. The question then is how this interplay of these two provisions play out in connection with the actions brought in
Goldwasser, Trinko, and Covad. For these purposes, we can quickly put Covad to one side because it involves a direct action by Covad against BellSouth for wrongs that arise out of their relationship. 48 That said, it is best to consider Trinko first because it involves a suit by the actual customers of a CLEC against the ILEC. Once that situation is understood, we can then turn to the second variation in Goldwasser, which involves a suit by direct customers of the ILEC who are potential customers of the CLEC.
Trinko. The key statutory provision of the Telecommunications Act is
Section 206 which provides that any common carrier who commits a wrong "shall be liable to the person or persons injured thereby," 49 The analogous We need not resolve the difficult issue of whether there is such a requirement, however, because on this record the plaintiff sufficiently alleges that it suffered a direct injury. In discussing the question of antitrust standing, the district court found that "the harm that these customers are alleging-damages resulting from poorer service than they would otherwise have received had Bell Atlantic acted lawfully-is wholly distinct from the harm suffered by the competitors." Trinko, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 741. The plaintiff alleges that it suffered a direct harm, poor phone service, as a result of the defendant's misconduct. While the district court may find otherwise after discovery and a motion for summary judgment, it is too early to to the person or persons injured thereby for the full amount of damages sustained in consequence of any such violation of the provisions of this chapter, together with a reasonable counsel or attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court in every case of recovery, which attorney's fee shall be taxed and collected as part of the costs in the case. own rights against Bell Atlantic will provide protection for its own customers.
Nothing here prevents Trinko from suing ATT if it so chooses, although in all likelihood it will be barred by contractual limitations against consequential damages. In the unlikely chance that such protection was not included, it is an open question whether ATT should be able to defend itself in that action by alleging the deficient service of Bell Atlantic. But for these purposes, the decision on that point does not matter. If the defense is disallowed, then ATT should be entitled to more substantial recovery against Bell Atlantic than would otherwise be the case. To support its argument for dismissal, the defendant points to the absence of published cases involving actions by indirect purchasers allegedly injured by railroad rates that were regulated by the now repealed Interstate Commerce Act ("ICA"). Although we have found no indirect purchaser case brought under the ICA, the defendant does not point to any authority barring such a suit. In light of the unambiguous language of sections 206 and 207, the absence of such a case is insufficient to establish that such an action is not permitted. 52 On the narrow point, this decision is right only in the most disingenuous and hyper technical sense, for the question of whether overcharges within a regulatory system raises parallel issues to those of Illinois Brick. Does the carrier who is able to pass these overcharges on to customers have the right to recover them from the railroad. That issue was raised in Southern Pacific Co. v. DarnellTaenzer Lumber Co., 53 which was relied on explicitly by the Supreme Court in both regulatory and antitrust contexts, and which was quoted with approval in Holmes. 54 In Southern Pacific, the precise question before the Supreme Court was whether an immediate customer could recover the full amount of the overcharge under the Interstate Commerce Act. In a literal sense, it is possible for Judge Katzmann to say that "we have found no indirect purchaser case." But in a functional sense, it is clear beyond a shadow of the doubt that Justice Holmes would have denied that action if it had been brought. Here is what he had to say:
[The indirect purchaser] has no privity with the carrier. The carrier ought not to be allowed to retain his illegal profit, and the only one who can take it from him is the one that alone was in relation with him, and from whom the carrier took the sum. Behind the technical mode of statement is the consideration well emphasized by the Interstate Commerce Commission, of the endlessness and futility of the effort to follow every transaction to its ultimate result. Probably in the end the public pays the damages in most cases of compensated torts. 55 Holmes's import is easy to collect by looking at the precedents he cites.
For example, State v. Central Vermont Ry. 56 did involve an indirect purchaser who was promptly bounced on privity grounds under a statute whose operative provision allowed the "party aggrieved" by an overcharge to obtain recovery 52 Trinko, at 100.
245 U.S. 531 (1918).
54 See Holmes, as quoted, note 44, supra.
55 Id. at 534. from the carrier. Nonetheless, the Court was emphatic that the common law rules carried over to the situation. I quote the passage in full so that there can be no mistake of its meaning.
The question here is regarding the right to sue. The right to recover an overcharge is given to the party aggrieved. The party aggrieved, in the natural sense, is one from whom the overcharge is demanded and collected. Does the fact that this person refrains from asserting his remedy, and recoups himself by an adjustment of prices based on the charges exacted, make each one of his purchasers a party aggrieved within the meaning of the statute? The parties thus aggrieved have no relations with the railroad company, and suffer but indirectly from the action of the company through the ordinary operation of the laws of trade. This plaintiff is injuriously affected as every member of the community is injuriously affected who purchases an article of merchandise at an increased price because of the payment by the dealer of an excess of freight charges. If such a payment of freight charges in the form of purchase price entitles the payor to recover from the railroad company, different persons, affected by the action of the company in different ways, are entitled to sue it for the same money. It can hardly be denied that a provision for the recovery of an overpayment points to the parties in whose dealings the overpayment was made, and to the payor therein as the party aggrieved. The loss of the plaintiff flows directly from the action of its vendor, and only indirectly from the defendant's overcharge. It may be substantially injured, but it cannot be brought within the remedy without holding that the right to sue follows the transfer of the property wherever it may be sold with the freight charges transformed into purchase price. A statute is not to be given a construction at variance with established rules of procedure unless the intention of the Legislature is apparent. 57 There is then a pretty solid line of cases that addresses the precise question on which Judge Katzmann could not find any relevant authority. The solution that it imposes anticipates that reached in Illinois Brick and Hanover Shoe.
The remote action is barred, and the immediate purchaser is able to recover the overcharge that is passed on. The blithe way in which Trinko ignores Holmes and 56 71 A. 193 (Vt. 1908) 57 Id. at 194. Trinko then is manifestly wrong in its treatment of the standing and privity issue. The analysis is far more difficult in dealing with the potential customers of the ILECs that preoccupied Judge Wood in her much more thoughtful analysis in Goldwasser, which proceeds as follows:
With these principles in mind, we turn to the question whether the Goldwasser plaintiffs had standing under the antitrust laws to bring their suit. We conclude that the answer is yes, no matter which branch of antitrust standing doctrine one considers. First, as we noted above, the plaintiffs were direct purchasers from Ameritech, and their complaint asserts that a variety of practices in which Ameritech has engaged and is engaging in have led prices for those services to be anticompetitively high, in violation of Section 2. As direct purchasers, they have no Illinois Brick problem. As people forced to pay an alleged monopolistic overcharge, they have described the kind of injury the antitrust laws are designed to redress, which is to say they have satisfied the "antitrust injury" requirement of Brunswick Corp. v how Holmes plays out in the current context, it is critical to look at the substantive allegations raised against Ameritech, which in this passage were elided to refer to those activities "in which Ameritech has engaged and is engaging in have led prices for those services to be anticompetitively high, in violation of Section 2."
But that version eliminates all reference to the competitors of Ameritech that Judge Wood noted were critical to the twenty basic allegations in Goldwasser's complaint. These followed the basic pattern claiming that Ameritech has not provided to its competitors certain services that it is obligated to do under the 1996 Telecommunications Act. 59 Two examples illustrate the basic theme:
(1) Ameritech is not providing the same quality of service to its competitors as it provides to itself, in violation of § 251.
(2) Again in violation of § 251, Ameritech has not given its competitors nondiscriminatory access to its operational support systems, nor has it given them access to unbundled elements of its system on terms equivalent to those Ameritech enjoys. 60 At this point it is critical to note that the chain of causation differs from that found in the ordinary case of price fixing overcharges to the immediate purchaser. Rather in the litany of charges raised in Goldwasser, the plaintiffs chief objection is that they have suffered as potential customers of some unidentified CLEC rival. Any charge that Ameritech simply used its statutory monopoly to charge too much money is defeated by the "filed rate" doctrine, which holds that rates approved by a regulator cannot be challenged in a damage action under the antitrust law. 61 The reason that this doctrine does not apply here is because the complaint alleges multiple harms that Ameritech's illegal practices have done to its competitors, in consequence of which their telecommunications options were circumscribed.
At this point, the case bears scant resemblance to the kinds of proof that are needed to make out the claim of causation and direct loss under Illinois Brick. 163-164 (1922) , noting that the rate hearing does not protect the parties from criminal proceedings, injunction, or forfeiture. Id. at 162-63. decided to stay with Ameritech, in which case they could well have benefited from any effort that Ameritech might have made to overload the costs of running the network on its incipient competitors. At this point, the ostensible unity of this class of plaintiffs breaks down. It therefore becomes apparent that the proper party to press claims against Ameritech for its alleged misconduct is some unnamed CLEC who is the direct victim of these specified wrongs. Its losses, if any, need not be reduced by any recoupment that it might receive from its customer base, present or future.
At this point, it becomes critical to stress yet again that the standing requirement, rightly understood, is not a part of any general test of proximate causation. Rather it is designed to make sure that the single defendant who is in the best position to press claims occupies the field to the exclusion of others. The Finally, we think Ameritech is wrong to claim that the plaintiffs lack standing because they are attempting to raise third-party rights--the rights of the competitors. It is true that the reason the plaintiffs have been injured (allegedly, of course) implicates the rights of the competitors not to be excluded from the local markets through anticompetitive actions of Ameritech, but that does not make this a jus tertii case. These plaintiffs want lower prices and more choice, and they claim that Ameritech (a monopolist) is doing things to prevent that from happening. Their theory is a classic exclusionary acts theory, and in all such cases, the monopolist's alleged sin is the exclusion of other competitors from the market. One assumes that those other competitors are grateful for the help from the consumer litigation, but that is incidental. The Goldwasser plaintiffs do not care in principle which competitors enter their markets; they just want a competitively structured local telephone market that will prevent Ameritech from inflicting antitrust injury on them. We are satisfied that they are asserting their own rights, and thus that they have standing. 62 This argument is correct in my view insofar as it holds that the doctrine of ius tertii is not part of this case. But the objection to the plaintiff's standing does not rest on that ground. Rather, the argument is that the plaintiff does not have standing under the general rules of the subject even if the injuries to it are distinctive from those of the CLECs. In the generalized discussion of standing above, claims for loss of business profits through the death or injury of a key employee are not efforts to recover a second time the losses that were sustained to the employee. They were efforts to vindicate the separate relational interest that the plaintiffs had on their own account. The standing requirement snuffed these 
